e or 05at, lay that coppear to drive individuials as well as groups into the us-e i vl)ence whilbe pointing out tho-t there appear to be ethic for s that countcrait those tendenc-ios. yaay so h
IIbel' Ls v zind La rqe intiiitive; ;t is not, for inst-anc,-b asedI in oar or~ri L onsof vast amounts of data. Equilibrium states are important for their own sake si. a they constitute stable configurations. However, from the point of view of examining violence--as a modality of political changre--states of equilibrium are uninteresting since they tell us nothing about the forces that maintain them. A brief excursion into some elementary notions of staLility might be appropriat here.
As a ces,-
When one wishes to determine whethe--a system is stable or riot, it is ouIStOr r to Subject 1t to a disturbance large or sma~ll. The system.
is stabLe if it responds-by returning to its original state after the distur_.bance has ceased or if it tends to a different but stable state after, withdrawal of the test disturbance,. Unstable systemns once disturheui not only fall1 to rett'rn to tireir original state but follow
Course of continuous change without ever reaching a plateau This rate of chanqe -,an be catast-rophkcally r-oid or it: canl be so -,,(w as to be iriper. ept ble ; a corta in degree of instabi ity is clearly necessary so, It: is inl the I ine teta i is antd their, ottk." t-, )l tthe 111,!A! of 'Itrse that thi 1:
nt oriti-en is b u e My idea is to establish a dichotomy between those functions of governent which are largely instrumental and can be assessed on a utilitarian basis and those which are sulject to valuation. Vaiuation is a judgmen" not of utility but of consonance with a set of ethical precepts.* My intent here is not only to avoid the ends-means trap, but to show in fact that ends and means, while judged differently, do affect each other.
In order to model this interaction, I have taken law enforcement to represent that aspect of government which can be subjected to a value-free analysis. Law enforcement in its most general connotation embodies all government functions pertaining to the execution of the law of the land. The narrower aspect of law enforcement, that is, maintenance of law and order, is, of course, subsumed here. In this broad context, law enforcement describes th-actual business of government.
Which laws are to be enforced is a vaiuo jgdement par excellence.
Albeit both laws and v enforcement contain elements that are routinely subjected to vale Juduments as well as to utilitarian evaluation. The idealization r troduced hy the model is based on the common perception of the dominant teatuve of tna3c nctions. I wish to emphasize the fact that I ar ropnsin: a :,de: rather than in explanation of v ilcere.
It is her'e that , t11y of the violence in Colombia could make a real contr 1ihtin, in the relatively short perii of 50 years Colombia ha. piassed thn-.ii at iea t three cyc os of violence and relative peace. are only a few of the terms used to describe a phenomenon widely held to be a unique attribute of our times. In fact, however, Babeuf, on tr ;il for his attempt to overthrow the French government, said in 1797:
"There are epochs in history when the hard and inflexible laws of development have concentrated all the wealth of a people in the hands of a tiny minority.....The mass of the people is appropriated by others; they are confronted by a caste which has grabbed everything for itself and hangs on to it pitile.sly. Such conditions determine the moment at which a mighty revolution breaks out. +hey precipitate one of these noble epochs, foreseen by the prophets of ancient times, in which a general upheaval in property relations becomes inevitable, and .n which the revolutionary uprising of the poor against the rich becomes a historical necessity."* This was more than 50 years before the Communist Manifesto was issued, aiding ,, theme that the poor cannot liberate themselves without changing 9 for the better] the whole society in the process.** This same messianic trend is carried on by Mao Tse-tung and reappears in Gu~vara 's advice to wcJuIl-be guerriLlas.
There is a message here that seems to speak -i universaL language--the language -, the have-nots. They are have-nots only in the sense that they have no ;aterial property. Nevertheless, it is they who are going to change the whole society and rake it a better one. Their fight is not simply the fight of the poor against the rich; theirs is the fight of the whole human race:
"In place of the old bourgeoi society, with its classes and class differences appe rs an association in which the free development of each is the condition for th;, free development of all. " * Needless to say, throughout history men have been-willing to die for less.
Furthermore, inspired by this historical calling the movement has produced leaders which were the bane of the custodians of the status quo. Metternich t s exasperated description has a hauntingly familiar ring as he exclaims: i "I have fought against the greatest soldier of our time; I succeeded in uniting Emperors and Kings, Tsar, Sultan, and Pope. But there was no man on earth who made things so difficult for me as that Li 1gand of an Italian, lean, pale, in rags--yet eLoquent like a tempest; ardent like an apostle; impudent like a thief; insolent like a comedian; unrelenting like a lover; and that man was Giuseppe Razzini :"* *From the CommLutist Manifesto. **Braunthal, op. cit., p. 82.
THE CONCEPT OF POWER
Talcott Parsons' definition of power as "the capacity to mobilize the resources of the socie ' for the attainment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment has been made, or may be made,"* fits our purpose very nicely. The exercise of this power leads, under certain circumstances, to war which is but a "continuation of state policy by other means" to use von Clausewitz's** famous dictum.
To von Clausewitz, war could never be separated from policy. In fact, he states:
war is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear the character of policy, it must reasuve with policy's ieasure."
Von Clausewitz (1780-1831), a contemporary of Metternich, lived during a peLiod of history that had much in ommon with our own. The
French iKevoLi,,tion reinvented the citizen army which, in his words, 
3.Wars of liberation
The stratemic objectives of wars of conquest are by far the simplest.
The objective is to acquire a certain territory. The indigenous population is subjugated, and if expedient it is liquidated.
This combination of territorial conquest and genocide is rare today but was quite cc;rromnplace in the period of colonization (1500-luOC).
In such a war , mnaxim=, military power is applied and the extent of the destruction wrought -is usually not deemed important. Examples are the settli4ng of North arn' South America.
Political wars are infinitely more complex. Those wa,.3 became more orevalent after the Industrial Revolution. The amount of terntory that changes hands is usually quite small, while the ostensible ideologicail content of the casuIs belli is significant.
World War II is a good example of an international political war.
Allied military 7-wer destroyed the Axis' war machine and in so doinbrought the enemy gove-nments down. The populations of the defeated Countries accepted -their new governments, which was the ostensible aim of this war,. 'Territorial occupation by the Allies was mainly symbolic s i nce violence actuaIly stoppeo af ter the cease, fire.
As a result of this war, Japan ceased to be the major military aj, 
CLASS STRUGGLE AND WARS OF LIBERATION
The MYarxist concepu Cf the c ass struggle envisages a conflict between the industrial proletariat and the capitalists who own the means of production. At the successful conclusion of the struggle, the proletariat wil]. have acquired the means of production and put them to use for the benefit of the working class rather than the privileged few.
It is to be noted here that this concept presupposes the existence of means of prodhictton; the class struggle is to return to the workers what is rightfully theirs but has been kept from them. Marx felt very strongly that capitalism is a necessary evil in the inexorable historical ev)lutLon towa'd ccmmu;is.
In fact, the Marxist theoreticians at the turn of the century thought of Russia as a very poor prospect for a comJunist z'evoiuaon because of the very low level of capitalistli develp:.en'm. Acc.rding to Regis Debray,* the Soviet Marxists-Leninists-_ )r:mun os still jainta>n this position and are taking a rathe, d-m :ciw cf "cominunist insurgenc~es" in the underdeveloped countr .os.
Faced with tlh's do , 1 leirra with respect to China, Mao Tsetung redef ined the _iass 1trus-a]e is a wa :
1)e ration.
Through a war of liberation, it is allee i a country can proceed from a precapitalistic stage directly to a cormunist one. The confrontation here is bet.een the rural m.asses on one side and the land owners and the urban entrepreneurs on the other side.
A war of liberation is a considerably more complex social process than a Marxist class struggle. A successful war of liberation, and there are only few such examples., must create entirely new formal and *Regis Debray, ".evolution in the Revolurion," Monthly Review, Vol.
19, Ne. 3, JuLy-August, 167.
-:*China, Cuba, N1orth Viet Nam. It is the latter that has given the would-be revolutionary leaders their worst headaches, as they are so often dealing with the rural proletariat--the peasant and the farmer.*
The essential characteristics of a war of liberation are:
1. Political mobilization of the rural masses by an effective political organization.
2. De-emphasis to the point of neglect of the revolutionary potential of the urban masses.
3. Goals which are not simply a change of government but the dislocation of the existing power structure and the substitution of an entirely new political system based on a communist or a communist-inspired version of the sovereignity of the masses. It is unlikely, in view of the increasingly effective counterinsurgency operations of most Latin American armed forces that future outbreaks of wars of liberation there will be based on the Cuban model.
It was characteristic of the Cuban experience that political organization followed the assumption of power rather than preceded it. The wars which we shall have to contend with will be much closer to the traditional civil war than to either the Chinese or the Cuban model. There will be one big difference, however --the simultaneous development of a political organization or infrastructure planted and nurtured by an effective party apparatus.
*10 I
THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT
Some necessary (pre-)conditions for the existence of an actual or potential state of insurgency are presented here. This discussion is limited in its applicability to countries which are usually referred to as "underdeveloped."
It is a cliche, albeit a useful one, to refer to the interaction of the government with the population as a communication process," and mutatis mutaiidis to government agencies as "communication channelb."* It will become clear later that insurgents work simultaneously on two essentially nonviolent tasks--(l) to disrupt and if possible destroy or preempt the incumbent's communication channels , and (2) to establish their own. The latter attempt starts out as informl social organizations, overtly or covertly subject to party discipline, and eventually culminates in a full-fledged social communications network, i.e., a shadow or de facto government. Shadow governments just like the legitimate variety need to control individual freedom if the excesses of some are not to endanger the political appeal to the then uncommitted.
The unusual savagery and brutality of the insurgent movements in Latin America is probably a good indication of lack of: control, planning, and leadership.
Resting lightly on our introduction, let us then present four points:
1. The primary means of communication between the government and the population are its "law enforcement agencies.
*The considerable appeal of this purely descriptive meta hor derives from the possibility of describing various malfunctionsas well as dysfunctions in such terms as: noise, channel capacity, etc., which have a high intuitive "information content." Douglas Pike, Viet Cong, The M.I.T. Press, Mass., 1966. 3. Regional or social factionalism is a source of strength to the population and of weakness to the government. It facilitates intra-faction communicationand impedes and at times mirnimizes the need for communication between the government and its people.
4. A low degree of interdependence between the factions and lower-level social organizational units promotes indifference to lack of communication with the government.
Points I and 2 are axiomatic whereas 3 and 4 can be and will be subjected to verification in Part III of this study.
Law enforcement in its most general connotation embodies all government functions pertaining to the execution of the law of the land.
The narrower aspects of law enforcement, that is, maintenance of law and order, are, of course, subsumed here. In this broad context, law enforcement describes the actual business of government. The executive branch of the government is responsible for carrying out this mission.
Law enforcement in the sense which is intended here derives from the previously quoted definition of Talcott Parsons of power.* Law enforcement as the execution of political power includes consequently the control and allocation of tangible assets like land as well as the disposition of revenue. Sii-c'e manpower is an exceptional resource, the control of it must a foi.tiori be subsumed here. This control can be repressive as practiced in dictatorships or permissive as exemplified in a liberal democracy. The efficacy with which law enforcement is executed provides a useful scale against which the level of development of a country can be measured i. Conversely, the level of development of a country sets an upper bnund on the measure of political power the government can effectively wield at any given time. These two competing factors--level of development and government power--can be in equilibrium at a pitifully low level. The question then is how to disturb the equilibrium so that development can proceed. The communist doctrine *Power is "the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment has been made, or may be made," loc. cit.
asserts the need to acquire power first in order to force the rate of development up. The democratic way is to f rst force the rate of development up and hope that the appropriate political changes will follow. It is important to bear in mind that the time scales for those two approaches are radically different.
Based on our definition of law enforiement, the execution of government falls into three categories:
The first category provides the government with the wherewithal for the execution of its functions. It includes typically the collection of taxes and duties but also provides for the mobilization of the armed forces. ALL government activities in this category are likely to be of little direct benefit to the population and as such tend to be resented. -On the other hand, those activities can be pursued even against strong opposition as long as the armed forces are sufficient in number and capability.
The sec,,nd category er.braces the protective, preventive, and punitive functions of the police and the judicial system. The control of physical resources includes such socio-econom.ic measures as supervision of trade, both national and international, and currency restrictions. In this category, we find both kinds of activities--those that restrict an individual's freedom of action and those that protect it.
The last category is usually the responsibility of departments for education, social welfare, health, agrarian and business credit, etc. These departments distribute the benefits of living in an organized society. involves not only the forral mechanisms of government, but the various institutional practices found in democratic society--party systems and interest organizations--that serve to facilitate the interchange between authority and the spontaneous groupings of society which have specific interests. The representation system links authority (legislative, executive, and judicial) with a variety of subgroups such as religions, classes, ethnic groups, occupations, regions, and so forth. keoresentation is neither sim:ply a means of pnl'tLcal adjustment to social pressures nor an instrument of ma.iipulation. It involves both functions. since the purpose of representation is to locate the combinations of relationships between parties and social bases which make possible the operation of efficient government. The fact that on the one hand the connection between taxes paid The individual tax payer' has learned from experience if by no other means that the i, ivrtdual ta , ,ol lector is the "lowest man on the totem pole" and that , a nts acanrvt the .evyin, of taxes must be presented elsewhere. This Is not to i;:ply that thw tax -oLlector is accepted but that the un d r'cuiima oy the civi1 service (as a conunication channel) i; a ,,e ! ecojrizeK fact.
Sho'id the tax payer feel that he is being taxed unfairly, he may seek relief either as an individua_-or in concert wth like-minded citizens by the follow..ing means* A. Have the tax laws changed by legally available means, or go to legitimate (anC different) tax agency personnel for redress.
B. Bribe the tax collector and/or his superiors.
C. Refuse to pay.
D.
Run the collector out of town.
E. Kill the tax collector.
The extent to which the degree of lawlessness represented by successive responses B to E is institutionally acceptable depends on a number of factors. Let us then consider each response separately.
A. Have the tax laws changed by legally available means, or go to legitimate (and different) tax agency personnel for redress. This is the constitutional approach. In order for this response to be effective, the tax payer has to ha,,e access to and influence cc the law makers. To be successful, the tax payer must be provided with a channel where the flow of cor.municat~on is opposite to the civil service chain and be independent of it. This apparatus has traditionally been the political party.
Where the law makers depend on the vote of the tax payer this institutional channel has worked fairly well. When the Legislators are elected by a privileged elite or are "appointed" by a ruling oligarchy. .Where law -rforceme~nt is sulhmarginal, thie tax payer may refuse to pay. ile f eels iiist Jif ied to pursue thiis course f or three reasons: Since the law enforcement capability of the government is inadequate, otherwise things might have not deteriorated so far, it will riot be able to protect the tax collector permanently.
E. The hostility engendered by repressive military or police
actions might then give vent in an attempt to kill the tax collector.
In suin ary, we may classify generically the five responses as A. Constitutional redress.
B. Corruption withirn the constitutional framework.
C. Civil disobedience.
D.
Vigilantism.
E. Violent disobedience ranging from isolated acts to fullfledged military actions--open insurgency.
These options are not mutually exclusive, in fact they usually coexist ranging from the highest degree of lawlessness present to constitutional redress.
Let us now examine the pLausible go,'ernment responses. The government is likely to be driven by their perception of what they ought to do and their realizations of what in fact they can do. This might be taken as a definition of the perceived "slip" in controL. This conflict between belief and reality, between value and utility or effectiveness spawns institutional violence just as the conflict between belief and perceived reality drives the population into insurrection. if the slip be large, as it is very likely to be in uLnderdeveloped countries, the government may attempt to gain ard actually sacceed to regain control by '-he ruthless application of force.
S-ch repressive activities of the authorities during the period when their, actual control is slipping is referred to by Fals Borda* as purposeful violence. The implication is that the authorities purposely engage in acts of violence to foster their own political motives and to impose their value systems onto the dissident population.
This official terror tends to be counterproductive because the authorities have no way of telling the fine differentiations between those who are their reluctant supporters and those who are in open rebellion. The many shades of dissent are all blended into one as objects of the indiscriminate official suppression. The reason, of course, that this situation prevails is that bidirectional lines of communication between the government and the rebellious population have never existed or, if they 64d, they were cut and all that remains is the unidirectional civil service.
For this repressive approach to accomplish its goal, it is crucial that any local successes be widely disseminated and for the message to be received by all dissidents and prospectlive insurgents. To the extent that the communication channels have been deactivate,!, the message will niot be received or, if received, will be garbled. The insurgent network, if dt is working, will, of course, take propagandistic advantage of the fact that while X incidents have taken place, the government It is very important to realize that criminal violence which is disorganized is relatively harmless from a political point of view.
* -
During the stage of political development when the state of anomie or of cultural and moral alienation of the population deepens, it is almost impossible to tell whether the social organizational patterns that will develop will be based on traditional values or on new values preached by some messianic movement that might be trying to benefit from this state of tabula rasa to impose its own .,alues.* A useful indicator of impending social tension can be found in the attitude towaird social,. roles and status.
Status is, after all, a manifestation of the existing social system and its values. When people begin to resent the attributes according to which status is establishLed, it is the first indication of a rent in the social fabric.
It is obvious that the organization of modern western industrial * nations is quite different fron, the original rural patterns. One of the first steps in the evolution of modern organizational patterns is the rationalization of agriculture. The land owner is replaced by a msanager as the source of juthority vis-A-vis the farmer. The manager has all * :.*Talking about social changes in American society, Merton makes the point that some tension is necessary: resulting from those seeming contradictions between cultural goals and so:cially restricted access to these goals; the operation of psycholooTiCal rechanisrs whereby discrepancies between culturally inlduced aspirat ,,ons anid socially feasile attainment,. are made to-lerable; thle ftinctional signifIcance for the stability of the social system of having diverse occupations which provide distinctive nonpecuniary rewards, perhaps thus curbing otherwise intolerable strains; the ext nt to which these strains exert pressure for change upon the culture (substituting "security" for "amrbition") and upon the social structure (changing the rules of' the game to enlarge the area of economic and political opportunity for the previously disposed)." Social Theory and Social Structure by Robert K. Merton, The Free Press, 1964. the ostensible attributes of authority except the intangible ones that the farmers are accustomed to associate with the status of landlord. This creates a fairly clean role conflict. The manager feels that he is not accepted in his role by the farmer, and the farmer finds it hard identify the parvenu with the traditional source of authority. Once it has become clear to the farmer that authority can be delegated, it is only a small step further to ignore it.
All that we said so far is quite rational, but human behavior patterns are not solely, based on sweet reason. The farmer and ',s landlord or local chieftain more Likely than not had a special relationship.
The master was accorded certain privileges and homage which in turn obligated the master to rake care of his subjects in a certain way.
Those are the unwritten laws of society. When the manager takes over, not only is he likely to be insensitive to this arrangement but, moreover, the farmer is likely to be quite unwilling to accept any largesse when not offered in the accustomed manner. In other words, the farmer may not reject the traditional values but only the official interpretation. A crucial question is how long a section of society can remain dedicated to its traditional values while losing confidence in its implementation. This is the conflict between ideal norms and expectations and the realistic assessment of achievement. Up to this point the dissidents are more nearly ref ormists; once they lose faith in the system they become truly revolutionaries. This revolutionai, attitude may remain hidden for a long time, waiting to be harnessed by an organization that has the ability to exploit its potential. A source of gr'eat puzzlement is the apparent willingness of revolutionaries to take upon tnemselves great hardships and to pursue a :courSe that on the face of it appears hopeless. If the state of social an ,Pie is in any respect compdrable to personal. anomie, then the individuals will be possessed by rather forceful suicidal tendencies, with the chatracteristic attitude that there *Ls nothing to live for any more.
This forceful and almost irreversible rejection of the traditional life when utilized by and channeled into A millenarian do_ trine can become very heady stuff. The notion of the historical inevitability of the socialist takeover--which is used over and over again--is quite understandable to a farmer who is not at all concerned with questions of freedom of will nd the attendant individual moral responsibility.
Catholicism, the dominant religion in Latin America, has been interpreted by rebellious priests as primarily a transcendental moral system without denying its divine inspiration. Leaning heavily on the teachings of Christ rather than the dicta of the Church, they have been able to roconc ie religion ,.it rebell ion and collaboration with left-wing leaders. *
The puritanical virtue so prominently displayed by some and aspired to by all the communist cadres is functionina to distinguish the true revolutionary, albeit an outlaw, from the c momon bandit. In this total.
state .-f confusion of traditional values rejected, status roles 'Iistorted, supportive social bonds broken, it is the comamnists with their "old-fashioned honesty" who represent moral strength."
In summary thor . the ability of the yovernrnent to communicate with its people is contingent upon an effective law enforcement apparatus--the government channel. A representative and responsive government needs .n addition a feedback apparatus--the popular channel.
*See, e.g., The Revolutionary Manifesto of 3 g Peruvian Priests, !a Prensa, Lima, Peru, March 22, 1968. **The moral fervor of the Black Muslims is another example.
The Popular Channel
Uipset's comments on representation* lend validity to the claim of I all governments of being representative in a fashion. A government that is truly nonrepresentative will in a nonstatic society be also nonresponsive and eventually dysfunctional. The proper question to ask, therefore, is not whether this or that government is responsive or not but to whom it is responsive. The broad representative characteristic of a democracy insures responsiveness to a wide section of the population, as was so well stated by Dr. Eduardo Santos in his presidential inaugural address in Bogat4 in 1938:** "Political and social coexistence in our country implies the existence of distinct forces and Fpolitical] parties which interact. This interaction must take place without loss of identity of the various doctrines and aspirations; all of which must be accorded the same rights before the law."
He goes on to say: "The indispensable and foremost prerequisite for this to take place is the realization within the goliernment that during che pre-election period it must not put itself preferentially at the disposal of one group or another. It must dedicate itself to the task of protecting the freedom of expression of the citizens so that the formation of public power and the orientation of national policy can proceed without threat and fraud."
The manner in which this "representation" is accomplished takes many forms. In small social units, every voter can participate directly. In a modern industrial state, which is another extreme, representatioh takes often a tortuous path. Voters designate spokesmen who in turn may designate representatives. Where one man represents thousands of voters, he will have to be guided by isome broad concepts and guidelines which he has reason to believe he shares with those he represents.
AtteT:ipts to solve the representation problem by ombudsmen or grievance cadres have not been successful.*'
In either case, one has to *Footnote, p. 16. the right, have been trying to achieve the same goal through the single allowed party channel. It appears that neither the democratic system nor the authoritarian system is able to cope with a direct challenge to the law enforcement apparatus. Neither system has shown the flexibility demanded by a situation such as the one presented by the student unrest.
Nevertheless! it was only a few years ago that the simplistic division of the world, like Gaul of old, into three parts--(l) free,
(2) communist, dnd (3) uncommitted--was believed to have some validity.
Commenting on this phenomenon, a columnxist for El Tiempo who writes under the nor de plume, SWANN observes:*
The capitalistic and bourgeois thesis presupposes the existence of political minorities and concedes them the right to express themselves and to participate in goverrment and society. This is violently opposed by the communist totalitarian antithesis which physically and intellectually eliminates its adversaries and proscribes any freedom of discussion which is considered a personal deviation. It appears. hcwever, that we are rapidly approaching the threshold of the synthesis,... 
I
The relevance of the student riots to a better undeorstanding of the function of the popular channel lies in the following. When a serious problem arises and the existing channels appear unable to handle it, new channels arise spontaneously or otherwise. If the government recognizes this channel as legitimate, the sort of adjustments that Lipset refers to can take place. If the government, however., for whatever reason refuses to tune in, then there are ordinarily only two options left: either the resort to extralegal pressure such as violence or the attempt to activate existing and accredited channels to carry the message.
Resort to the former is facilitated by the precipitants of revolution, i.e., in each case, a dictatori-' figure or J roup openly and cynically den ied the elec -orate the opportunity to select its own leaders ip.
Such open defiance of the nation was more than simTrly a breach of constitutional norms: it showed contempt for the ,-itizenry. In each case, the arbitrary and vloie t ,.eascnre discredited the group involved 'the incui'bnts 1 revealed its relia.ce o. force rather than consent and provided .Oal anid political justification for revolution." r ... ,, ,las ier, "Sn::
in ee r-: * ,,
Centralization and Factionalism
Adam Smith wrought a truly monumental political revolution with his concept of "division of labor." According to this iprecept, each produces that for which he is best qualified by virtue of equipment, resources, or both. This applies to individuals singly or in association, as well as to nations. The implementation cf this economic strategy did much toward maintaining the underdeveloped countries as suppliers of resources and in their state of development. Division of labor, however, was a mixed blessing for both the industrialized nations who processed the raw materials and the countries that concentrated on extractive industries. While this arrangement made large colonial empiresleconomically very attractive, it made them also in the long run politically unstable. The interdependence which was the functional featurc for the colonial powers was dysfunctional for the economic development of the dependencies.
Being dysfunctional, it required more and more force on the part of the colonial powers to hold their empires together, till the cost of maintaining the empire exceeded the benefits of preferential economic bonds with the colonies. At this point, the arrangement became dysfunctional for all concerned and the empires disintegrated. Interdependence here as everywhere else created the need for governmental police power.
On a snaller scale within a nation one meets again with the problems created by division of labor, with the ensuing interdependence and the need for'a central government to wield the police power. In an underdeveloped country, however, one starts out wifth a situation where the bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture and produces almost everything for the satisfaction of the needs of the family or clan. Their dependence on outsiders is usually limited to suppliers of salt, clothing, medicine, possibly liquor and tobacco. The trade involved is generally so small that one can hardly talk of a money economy. It is difficult to see at that stage any function a central authority could usefully perform. The government, such as there is, in its quest to raise -he standard of living, must transform this pastoral way of life into one compatible with a money economy.
Mhen the existing social order with its geopolitical divisions is based on economic interests fortified by ethnic or cultural bonds, it presents to the central government a tough nut to crack. The nut must be cracked if Lokalpatriotismus is to be replaced by a sense of nationhood.
As long as the traditional order is vipble, it is a source of strength in the fight against the encroachment of the power of the central goverrmnent.
The strength derives fror. the simple view that the central government has apparently nothing to offer that the traditionalists would like to have.
It is in this spirit that Ralph Waldo Emerson exclaims: "The less government we have--the bette-. '* The communists have always appreciated the need to foster economic interdependence in order to force dependence on the central goverrmient.
The ruthless collectivization of agriculture serves this purpose very well. The elimination of :sinifundias with their tiny cash crops and subsistence farming drives the peasants into a larger money ec-nomy and into reliance on the regulatory functions of the central government. Once the government is able to present itself as a functional organization, it can also begin to establish a basis for the workings of its law enforcement machine, i.e., the acquisition and contr.ol of resources.
The democratic way to an effective cenrral government is a rocky road indeed. Democracy, both pcLiti(al and economic, is based on a dynamic state of equilibrii of social and economic tensions brought about by the interaction of many relatively small units. This fosters traditionalism and factionalism which is completely antithetical to the spirit of a strong central goverrnent. The dilemma then is how to bring about the needed modernization without destroying the polycentrism so essential to the workings of a derocracy.
AsstLming that the central government claims to represent the forces of democracy while the insurgents are labeled as communists, one is like.y to be confronted with a rather odd scenario. The government, in order to establish and assert political (not .-ilitary) control of the countryside, engages in "pacif ication" programs. These efforts are meant to ra'se the standard of 1winq of the farmers while simultaneously engendering loyalty !,ia iph 4a lio Emerson, On Politics, I , I.
and dependence on the capital. Pacification thus tends to undermine the independence that is so much a feature of the democratic process.
The insurgents on the other hand encourage separatism as an obvious counter to government c~ntrol, relying however on the transcending unify- "This work [of model-building] :onsists of picking out certain facts rather than others, in pinning theM down by label-*ling them, in accumulating further facts in order not only to supplement but in part also to replace those originally fastened upon, in formLlating and improving the relations perceived--briefly in 'factual' and 'theoretical' research that go on in an endless chain of give E-.d take, the facts suggesting new analytic instruments I have tried to avoid the Scylla of ultimate functionalism which in a reductio ad absurdumr cou'd reconcile itself to M~ussolini t s fascismT since The made the trairs run on time," without falling into the Charybdis of sterile dogmatism. A true revolution is man against mrachine: be that the computer or bureaucracy, diesel locomotives, or the multiversity. The fight is for the control of the machines; the destruction attempted by the 1MaschienenstUrmer was counterrevolutionary i-f anything.
Values determine in the last analysis who is to control what for whose benefit rather than considerations of efficiency or effectiveness. When this controlling function becomes divorced from the popular will and ceases to be amenable to popular influence for lack of communication, one reaches a situation where "taxation without representation" becomes unbearable and open rebellion is born.
